Bridget Kendall
Diplomatic correspondent
For the past two years the story of Vladimir Putin's Russia has been a tale of two halves.
His supporters (plus, with grudging admiration, some of his detractors) have hailed him as a skilful strategist. They argue that his interventions in Ukraine and Syria caught Western powers unawares and made the world see that he was an international player to be reckoned with.
And it is true that, unlike most Western leaders who have to keep an eye on election cycles, he can afford to exercise strategic patience. Already more than 15 years at the helm and constitutionally able to stay on as president until 2024, with no viable opponent in sight, he can afford to wait and overcome setbacks if he doesn't get his way immediately.
It is also no secret that he does have long-term strategic goals. He talks about them all the time.
He is determined to wield his country's military clout, so that the world in general and the United States in particular realise that Russia is a great power, an equal partner whose interests must be accommodated.
He wants the West to acknowledge Russia's right to treat its post-Soviet neighbours as part of its sphere of influence, free from links to Nato or any other Western-dominated alliance.
He is on the lookout for levers to weaken Europe's ties with the US, in the hope of one day turning Russia into Europe's main strategic partner.
He keeps tightening his grip at home to avoid threats to his own power (like those street protests in 2011) and to the country's stability.
And he seeks to re-orientate the Russian economy to protect it from foreigners, and reduce its reliance on imports and plummeting energy prices.
Short-term retaliation
But not everyone is convinced that Mr Putin is a master strategist. Others see him as more of a tactician, constantly tacking back and forth in abrupt zigzags. His switches of policy may catch the world by surprise, say these critics, but they are more probably the result of short-term thinking than long-term planning.
Some gestures, they argue, are outbursts of retaliatory fury. Both the annexation of Crimea and Mr Putin's recent rupture in relations with Turkey would fall into this category. Some moves can be seen as ways to extricate Moscow from faltering policies.
So this summer the guns went quiet in eastern Ukraine where the so-called Novorossiya project had failed to materialise and where a simmering war with its closest Slavic neighbour was proving unpopular with the Russian people. In its place came a new and bigger military campaign against an even more compelling enemy: the jihadist extremists in Syria.
On Russia's state-run TV the conversation abruptly changed too: no longer was the focus on Ukraine's government as "fascist" and "illegitimate"; no longer was the US painted as an existential enemy who for decades had been trying to dismember first the Soviet Union and then Russia.
Now, domestic viewers were told, it was the jihadist threat which was paramount, not just to President Assad of Syria but to Russia itself too. And only by striking the enemy first could Russia stay safe from it.
So now the West was no longer the main threat but a reluctant partner, and Western leaders were invited to remember earlier times when they put aside differences with Moscow to defeat a common Nazi enemy.
Such moves, say Mr Putin's critics, may satisfy short-term goals, such as forcing the outside world to pay attention to Russia and boosting his domestic popularity, but in the longer term they are often highly risky.
Dominance challenged
After all, probably contrary to Kremlin expectations, the Western sanctions against Russia have not wavered. Ukraine, the Baltics and others once in Russia's sphere of influence now see it as an enemy.
Montenegro, once a haven of Russian influence in the Balkans, now wants to join Nato. Having shot down a Russian plane, Turkey has gone from valued partner to mortal enemy. Even China, while ostensibly an important alternative ally, is challenging Russian dominance in Central Asia through its new Silk Road project.
And all the while at home the combination of sanctions and counter-sanctions, investor flight and low oil prices leading to a plummeting rouble has plunged Russia into what could be a sustained and painful recession.
Even the latest policy switch - towards war in Syria - has had its setbacks. No longer is Russia claiming as it did at the outset that this will be a short, sharp air campaign, over in four or five months. Now Russian officials admit they are likely to be in for the long haul.
And far from making Russia safer, the air campaign in Syria has already made it more of a target, with the tragic downing of a planeload of Russian tourists heading home from Egypt being seen by many as jihadist retaliation for Russian air strikes.
Already, in response, Russians are being encouraged not to risk foreign travel any more, for fear they might be targeted by enemies.
So what will 2016 bring?
New friends
The short answer is in foreign policy terms probably more of the same. President Putin's long-term objectives won't alter. He will continue to seek out new allies among populist politicians in Europe. Poland is one country to watch.
The run-up to German and French elections in 2017 will be watched closely in Moscow, especially if Nicolas Sarkozy looks like he could make it back to the Elysee. And a potential "Brexit" will be seen in Moscow as another possible weakening of the European project, which could provide it with new opportunities.
President Putin will no doubt also hope to make further headway in getting the outgoing Obama administration or the new incomer to do more to recognise Russia's importance.He may well harbour the hope that Donald Trump makes it to the White House. Mr Putin has a liking for maverick politicians - think of his friendship with Italy's Silvio Berlusconi.
It was notable that he went out of his way to compliment Mr Trump during his end of year Kremlin press conference. And he probably worries that Hillary Clinton, well versed in foreign policy from her time at the State Department, may prove a tougher interlocutor.
Fragile Ukraine and Syria
No doubt his Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, will continue to press for political solutions to the Ukraine crisis, through the Minsk process and in Syria, through what Moscow now describes as the Vienna process. But the omens are not good.
In Ukraine, the ceasefire is fragile. There has been renewed gunfire along the front line in recent weeks. Moscow says it won't fulfil the main condition of the Minsk agreement - restoring control of the border to Ukraine - until the status and autonomy of its rump statelet in the Donbass (the eastern region of Ukraine) is secured to its satisfaction, which seems unlikely.
Already Western sanctions have been extended until July. The uneasy status quo could well solidify this year, turning eastern Ukraine into yet another post-Soviet frozen conflict, which could stay in place for decades.
As for Syria, January is supposed to see the launch of a UN-sponsored third peace process. So far two rounds of peace talks have foundered.
And even if this time President Putin desperately needs a peace deal to extricate himself militarily from Syria, it is uncertain quite how far Russia's influence extends. He may now have more leverage over President Assad than he did, but there are also the conflicting interests of Shia Iran and the Sunni Arabs of the Gulf to contend with.
And while Syrian opposition groups continue to complain they are being hit by Russian bombs, it is unclear how they can be brought to the negotiating table, let alone be persuaded to turn round to fight so-called Islamic State (IS) targets, while trusting that the Syrian government forces which they once opposed, and which are now at their backs, won't take advantage of them.
'Fortress Russia'
But the most important focus for Russia in 2016 may be domestic.
The economic outlook is sobering.
President Putin claims that the peak of the economic crisis is over, and points to record harvests and dairy production as proof that Russia is already benefiting from "import substitution" and increased investments in agriculture.
But in other parts of the economy the picture is gloomy. Crude oil prices have plunged two-thirds since 2014, causing the rouble to sink in tandem.
Next year's budget is based on the assumption that oil prices will be at $50 a barrel, which could be a vast overestimate. If oil prices stay low, there will have to be severe cuts in the budget, with knock-on impact on payments and services which could adversely affect the very people who are Mr Putin's core supporters.
The Russian government will do what it can to cushion the blow, especially with parliamentary elections due in September - always seen as a litmus test of support for the government. But a recent strike by truckers and a smaller protest by teachers in the Urals will have worried the Kremlin. Keeping the lid on further protests will no doubt be a priority.
Add to this the Kremlin's concern about possible threats from IS extremists on Russian soil, and it seems inevitable that 2016 will more than ever be a year of "fortress Russia".
Ordinary Russians will be further discouraged from foreign travel on security grounds. New legislation may make it easier for the government to crack down on or stifle its opponents. Migrant workers from the Caucasus and Central Asia may find themselves scrutinised even more closely for possible links to jihadist groups in the Middle East and Afghanistan.
Under threat from economic decline and from potential extremist jihadist attacks, Mr Putin may well feel under pressure. It could be an argument for him to try to end his row with the West, to get sanctions lifted and to find a way to end the war in Syria.
But if he feels he is being pushed too far, it is also an argument for him to batten down the hatches and tell the Russian people they face a dangerous world out there, no foreigners are to be trusted, and in the name of national security no disloyalty will be tolerated.
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